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ABSTRACT 
 
In the twenty-first century, a wide range of complex global 
challenges will require unprecedented levels of global cooperation 
between states and non-state actors.  Yet few leading international 
institutions today are designed to effectively leverage the 
resources, ingenuity, and connectivity of diverse societal actors.  
While some scholars maintain the view that civil society should not 
meaningfully participate in the governance of international 
institutions, a new generation of multi-stakeholder institutions 
points to a new way of understanding the relationship between 
non-state actors and international institutions.  This article 
examines the role of civil society in the governance of international 
institutions and highlights this new generation of multi-
stakeholder institutions that involve non-state actors as full 
participants in governance.  It applies insights from work on 
associative democracy to suggest a new approach to evaluating 
civil society participation within international institutions.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the twenty-first century, a wide range of complex global 
challenges will require unprecedented levels of global cooperation.  
However, most of the international institutions we inherited from 
the last century were designed only to promote cooperation among 
states in the context of a very different world in the wake of World 
War II.  Sixty-five years later, many of today’s biggest challenges 
can no longer be managed or solved by states alone, but instead 
require the resources, ingenuity, and connectivity of diverse 
societal actors.  A new generation of institutions is increasingly 
harnessing the energies of civil society organizations1 and other 
non-state actors through multi-stakeholder forms of governance.  
The governance of international institutions and the expanding 
role of these institutions in responding to key global challenges has 
become a resurgent area of research interest.2
 
1 See John Gerard Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain—Issues, 
Actors, and Practices, 10 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 499, 522 n.1 (2004) (defining civil society 
organizations (“CSOs”) as “transnational social movements, coalitions, and 
activist campaigns as well as formal non-governmental organizations”). 
  However, a number 
2 See generally JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-
MAKERS (2005); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 10, 18 (2004); 
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International 
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 29 (1998); Kenneth Anderson, Book Review: 
Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global 
Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1311 (2005); Daniel Bodansky, The 
Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596 (1999); Steve Charnovitz, 
Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 372 
(2006); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing 
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J 1490 (2006); Andrew T. Guzman, Global 
Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303 (2004); Laurence R. Helfer, 
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of theorists remain skeptical that civil society should play a 
significant role in the governance of international institutions.3
Civil society groups are becoming key actors in a wide range of 
international arenas that were formerly the exclusive province of 
states and increasingly viewed as essential actors in many of these 
areas.  Few people would suggest today that contemporary global 
challenges in areas such as climate change or global health can be 
solved by states alone without the extensive participation of non-
state actors.  Thus far, relatively few scholars have examined a new 
generation of twenty-first century international institutions that are 
moving away from exclusively intergovernmental structures and 
towards multi-stakeholder partnerships where non-state actors are 
full participants in governance.
  
This article argues that involving civil society in the governance of 
international institutions is increasingly necessary and that the 
traditional approach of consultation is inadequate to catalyze their 
potential contribution to these institutions.  Instead, multi-
stakeholder forms of governance, which are features of a number 
of twenty-first century institutions, will be increasingly critical to 
the success of many international institutions. 
4
 
Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and Innovation in 
the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649 (2006); Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Between 
Centralization and Fragmentation: The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of 
Democratic Legitimacy 4–6 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Working Paper 
No. 01-004, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=262175; 
Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005); Kal Raustiala, The “Participatory Revolution” in 
International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537 (1997); Ruggie, supra 
note 1, at 499. 
  Most work on civil society 
3 See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Global Governance: The Problematic Legitimacy 
Relationship between Global Civil Society and the United Nations (Am. Univ., Wash. 
Coll. of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2008-71, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1265839 (arguing that non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”) do not possess sufficient democratic 
qualities to play a legitimate role in global governance); John R. Bolton, Should We 
Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 205, 217 (2000) (“[I]t is precisely 
the detachment from governments that makes international civil society so 
troubling, at least for democracies.”); Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law 
Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
369 (2001) (arguing that NGOs are epistemic communities that develop rules 
through opaque processes that do not involve the participation of voters). 
4 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International 
Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration 
Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 577–78. 
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participation within international institutions has primarily 
focused on the practice of twentieth century institutions, which 
significantly informs the conclusions that many theorists draw 
about the role of non-state actors in governance.5
Innovative twenty-first century institutions, in areas such as 
global health, are demonstrating that multi-stakeholder 
governance can be extremely successful and increasingly 
undermining the logic of those who reject the idea of moving 
beyond exclusively inter-governmental arrangements.  A rich 
literature on associative democracy, which is usually applied to 
national contexts, offers fresh insights into some of the key design 
challenges facing these multi-stakeholder institutions in terms of 
enhancing the contribution of civil society actors.
   
6
Section 1 examines the theoretical objections raised by scholars 
to the inclusion of civil society actors in the governance of 
international institutions.  It seeks to understand these objections in 
the context of the practice of leading international institutions, such 
as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions.  Section 
2 highlights a new generation of institutions challenging the 
traditional view that states are the only legitimate actors within 
international institutions.  Section 3 applies insights from 
associative democracy theorists and develops an approach to 
evaluating civil society participation that seeks to respond to the 
objections posed by critics and offer lessons for the design of 
effective international institutions for the twenty-first century. 
 
 
5 See, e.g., Chadwick Alger, The Emerging Roles of NGOs in the UN System: 
From Article 71 to a People’s Millennium Assembly, 8 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 93 (2002) 
(examining the developing relationship between the U.N. system and civil society 
during the twentieth century); Anderson, supra note 2, at 1311; Charnovitz, supra 
note 2, at 352–55 (examining the influence of NGOs on international law with 
particular attention to developments in the twentieth century). 
6 See, e.g., Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic 
Governance, 20 POL. & SOC’Y 393, 464–65 (1992) (suggesting that associative 
democracy can enhance democracy while avoiding the dangers of factionalism); 
Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Thinking about Empowered Participatory 
Governance, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED 
PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 3, 5 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003) 
(highlighting the reform models that engage ordinary citizens in policymaking 
which affects their lives). 
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2. THE MONOPOLY OF STATES APPROACH 
Many contemporary scholars of international institutions still 
hold the view that states are the only legitimate actors that should 
participate in the governance of international institutions.  Even as 
the scope of involvement of non-state actors continues to expand 
within most international institutions, significant debate remains 
over the wisdom of civil society participation in the formal 
governance of these institutions.  A number of scholars challenge 
whether civil society should meaningfully participate at all in the 
governance of international institutions.7  Some have even argued 
that expanded societal participation reflects a flawed attempt by an 
insufficiently representative civil society and incompetent 
international institutions to generate legitimacy for each other.8  
Civil society representation in the governance of international 
institutions is rejected on the grounds that these groups are not 
representative,9 not sufficiently accountable or legitimate,10
 
7 See Anderson, supra note 3, at 25–27 (suggesting that CSOs are just one type 
of the many pressure groups involved in the democratic process, and that their 
participation does not confer democratic legitimacy per se); Kenneth Anderson & 
David Rieff, ‘Global Civil Society’: A Skeptical View, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2004/5 
26, 35–36 (Helmut Anheier et al. eds., 2005) (suggesting that when stakes are high, 
particularly during wartime, international organizations turn to the legitimacy 
that comes from important state actors, rather than international NGOs); Thomas 
M. Franck, Remarks, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS NEW SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 151, 152 (Rainer Hofmann ed., 1998) (“Not only do NGOs not address [the 
problem of representativeness] because they are in no sense a substitute for some 
direct form of representation of people in the process which normally one thinks 
of as parliamentary representation. . . . NGOs are irrelevant . . . .”). 
 or that 
their very independence from states conflicts with participation in 
8 See Anderson & Rieff, supra note 7, at 36 (noting that the mutual support 
and legitimacy that international organizations and global civil society 
organizations provide to each other “appears to have led the NGOs astray”). 
9 See Bolton, supra note 3, at 217 (raising the concern of international NGOs’ 
ability to undermine democratic systems by achieving policy results they could 
not otherwise achieve); Anderson, supra note 3, at 12–17 (disputing the idea that 
international NGOs are the “legitimate representatives of the world’s people”). 
10 See Antonio F. Perez, Who Killed Sovereignty? Or: Changing Norms 
Concerning Sovereignty in International Law, 14 WIS. INT’L L.J. 463, 489 (1996) 
(suggesting that the community of sovereignty and community of knowledge-
base experts lack democratic legitimacy because they do not involve a “political 
process . . . built around a politics of interest of groups, not reified states, and 
managed by politicians, not technocratic experts”); Shapiro, supra note 3, at 376 
(noting the opaque processes used by international NGOs, and suggesting that 
international procedures may create accountability and transparency). 
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international institutions.11
The most consistent and, in some ways, most powerful 
argument against civil society representation in the governance of 
international institutions is that non-state actors are not 
representative in the traditional sense because they are usually not 
elected.
  These arguments fit broadly within 
what I refer to as the “monopoly of states” approach, which holds 
that states alone should govern international institutions and 
rejects the idea that civil society and non-state actors should 
significantly participate in the governance of these institutions. 
12  The most basic version of this is sometimes posed with 
the question: “[W]ho elected the NGOs?”13  In the first instance, it 
is clear that most NGO leaders are not elected and even those who 
are elected can usually claim to formally represent only a relatively 
small slice of a given population.14  A more subtle version of the 
question of representation has been framed as “[h]ow 
representative must an organization be in order to deserve a seat in 
governing bodies?”15
In the case of many countries, the representation by 
governments within international institutions does not adequately 
or effectively reflect the views of its citizens.
  These concerns about the representative 
nature of civil society should be examined against the backdrop of 
the representational role of other actors within international 
institutions. 
16
 
11 See Marina Ottaway, Corporatism Goes Global: International Organizations, 
Nongovernmental Organization Networks, and Transnational Business, 7 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 265, 267 (2001) (arguing that the cost of corporatist arrangements 
between international organizations and international NGOs outweigh their 
benefits). 
  Some states are 
12 See Raustiala, supra note 2, at 567 (“[M]any powerful NGOs come from a 
small minority of advanced industrial states, and NGO views are often far from 
reflective of the public at large.”). 
13 See Anderson, supra note 3, at 28–29 (citing David Rieff and questioning the 
representativeness of international NGOs). 
14 See id. at 27 (describing NGOs as organizations that provide a voice for 
civil society in undemocratic states, but noting that they are not an effective 
substitute for democratic elections). 
15 See Michael Edwards, Introduction to GLOBAL CITIZEN ACTION 1, 6–8 
(Michael Edwards & John Gaventa eds., 2001) (posing the question of how 
legitimate a NGO must be to gain a vote in a global organization, and suggesting 
that these less heard from voices “add[] an essential layer of checks and balances 
into the international system”). 
16 See Paul Wapner, Defending Accountability in NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 
198  (2002) (“There are plenty of nondemocratic polities ruled by those who are 
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represented in international institutions by authoritarian 
governments which are unlikely to adequately reflect the views of 
the citizens of that country, given the lack of effective democratic 
processes.  The military rulers of Burma, for example, hold a seat 
on the General Assembly of the United Nations but seem to have 
little claim to represent the people of Burma in any democratic 
sense. 
At the same time, other states have virtually no representation 
within the governance of key international institutions.  In the case 
of many international institutions, those living in the poorest 
countries often have relatively little representation through their 
governments in the formal decision-making processes of these 
institutions.  On the U.N. Security Council, there are no permanent 
members from the countries in the Southern Hemisphere.  In the 
International Monetary Fund, the entire continent of Africa holds 
less than 5% of the votes within the institution and the country of 
Eritrea holds just 0.02% of the total IMF votes.17
In both of these circumstances, when a state has little or no 
representation or when a state is represented by leaders who were 
not selected by its people, there is a reasonable basis to assume that 
non-state actors might be able to make a contribution by raising 
concerns and offering views that would not otherwise be heard in 
forums limited to states alone.
  If many countries 
are not represented at all, or significantly, within international 
institutions it complicates the idea that states alone can effectively 
represent diverse populations in the context of governance. 
18  Sometimes these groups 
accentuate the voice of the often-underrepresented Southern 
Hemisphere, while in other cases, civil society groups might raise 
issues of concern to marginalized groups within many countries.19
 
immune from constitutional constraints and that worry little about satisfying a 
broad-based, collective interest.”). 
 
17 IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm (last updated Nov. 23, 
2010). 
18 See Kal Raustiala, States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions, 
41 INT’L STUD. Q. 719 (1997) (describing the tendency of NGOs to uphold values 
and concerns that would not otherwise be protected, and explaining the benefits 
that states receive from NGO inclusion, such as the enhanced ability to create and 
maintain international regulatory rules). 
19 See Richard H. Stanley, President, The Stanley Found., Opening Remarks 
to The Thirteenth United Nations Issues Conference, Feb. 19–21, 1999, in THE 
STANLEY FOUNDATION, THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE ROLE OF NGOS 
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A different critique of civil society participation in governance 
is tied to the concern that Northern groups would dominate 
Southern groups in these global forums.20
Another core critique of civil society involvement with 
international institutions is that civil society groups are not 
sufficiently accountable.
  Indeed, this balance 
between North and South is already a challenge within most 
international institutions, even when governance is limited 
exclusively to state actors.  It is not at all clear that excluding civil 
society altogether from formal governance helps to solve this 
underlying problem, as it very likely leaves those living in the 
Southern Hemisphere with less of a voice than they would have in 
an imperfect governance structure that includes civil society.  New 
models of constituency-based participation by both Northern and 
Southern NGOs, which will be examined in the next section, offer 
one potential response to concerns about the geographic balance of 
civil society participation. 
21  Given that most non-state actors are not 
directly accountable through elections, it is reasonable to ask by 
what mechanism these groups can be held accountable at all.  
Some commentators suggest that there should be more universal 
standards for the transparency and integrity of non-governmental 
organizations.22
 
7, 9, available at http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/archive 
/Issues99.pdf (noting that, while some NGOs represent the values and concerns 
of their members, there are other NGOs that address the concerns of an 
“externally defined geographic or community constituency”). 
  Others suggest that the accountability of NGOs 
“should depend upon the particular governance function they 
20 See Karin Bäckstrand, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable 
Development: Rethinking Legitimacy, Accountability and Effectiveness, 16 EUR. ENV’T 
290, 299 (2006) (concluding that most transnational partnerships are North driven, 
composed primarily of international organizations and industrialized states); 
Klaus Dingwerth, Private Transnational Governance and the Developing World: A 
Comparative Perspective, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 607, 625 (2008) (noting the lower 
representation of Southern stakeholders in international governing bodies). 
21 See Yanyu Ke, The Democratic Deficit, Intergovernmental Organizations, 
and Global Civil Society 15 (Feb. 15, 2009) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/3/3/7/
pages313370/p313370-1.php (“Many NGOs lack necessary expertise and 
negotiating skills . . . in improving accountability and public participation in 
IGOs.”). 
22 See id. at 13–17 (suggesting that increased transparency and homogeneity 
amongst NGOs could more effectively promote democracy in IGOs, as well as 
increase their own democratic accountability). 
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perform.”23  Still others argue that a better approach is to 
encourage NGOs to be accountable to their own constituencies, a 
goal that can itself be encouraged through the very process of 
becoming repeat players in the governance of international 
institutions.24  Since NGOs are particularly vulnerable to threats to 
their reputations—and because they are otherwise fairly weak 
actors who rely on their credibility for influence—reputational 
concerns can be a powerful accountability mechanism.25
The incentives for civil society actors involved in sustained 
interactions on substantive matters within international 
institutions are quite different from the incentives for those 
without access to the deliberations of these institutions.  The 
experience of being repeat players with a meaningful voice in these 
institutions—in addition to the importance of protecting their 
reputation for credibility outside of such institutions—also serves 
as a basis for accountability, even without direct elections, for 
many civil society groups.
 
26
Accountability is already perceived as a weakness of many 
international institutions in part because of the perceived lack of 
 
 
23 Erik B. Bluemel, Overcoming NGO Accountability Concerns in International 
Governance, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 139, 143 (2005). 
24 See Steve Charnovitz, Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations in 
Global Governance, in NGO ACCOUNTABILITY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES AND INNOVATIONS 
21, 27–28 (Lisa Jordan & Peter van Tuijl eds., 2006) (highlighting Peter Spiro’s 
argument that the inclusion of NGOs in international decision-making would 
make them accountable as repeat players on the international stage). 
25 See Robert O. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, in 
TAMING GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 130, 153 (David Held & 
Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2003); Wapner, supra note 16, at 203–04 (noting 
that reputational and credibility-based concerns can serve as both an 
accountability mechanism and as a powerful incentive for NGOs to self-police). 
26 See Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown, Introduction to THE STRUGGLE FOR 
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 1, 21 
(Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998) (explaining that while NGOs are 
not subject to normal institutional accountability mechanisms, they are made 
accountable by virtue of their representational concerns and their need to interact 
on a continuing basis with other international actors); Wapner, supra note 16, at 
203–04 (arguing that civil society actors must maintain their reputation for 
credibility and be accountable to state actors if they are to work successfully 
within international forums); Vivien Collingwood & Louis Logister, Perceptions of 
the Legitimacy of International NGOs, in NGO INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 21, 30 (Anton Vedder, ed. 2007) (“Certain NGOs draw 
legitimacy from their refusal to take money from, or bargain with, political or 
corporate bodies.”). 
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transparency.  Many of these institutions face growing challenges 
to their legitimacy as democratic norms become more strongly 
embedded internationally.27  According to Robert Keohane and 
Joseph Nye, the older, “club” model of global governance faces 
increasing challenges because of its lack of transparency to 
outsiders and participation is generally limited to officials from a 
relatively small group of countries.28  Transparency is generally 
enhanced by the participation of civil society within international 
organizations.  In fact, NGO participation was found to be a 
leading predictor of organizational transparency in a recent study 
of 72 international organizations.29
Recent work on the legitimacy of international institutions has 
highlighted the importance of “input legitimacy,” as well as 
“output legitimacy,” or successful problem-solving.
  
30
 
27 See Claudia Kissling & Jens Steffek, CSOs and Democratization of 
International Governance: Prospects and Problems, in CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN 
EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A CURE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT? 208, 
216 (Jens Steffek et al. eds., 2008) (“We can conclude from the evidence presented 
in this book that the participatory practices in international organizations need to 
be improved if the existing potentials for democratizing international decision-
making are to be realized.”). 
  Rules 
promoting transparency and public participation in international 
institutions can be extremely important to promoting procedural 
28 See Keohane & Nye, supra note 2, at 4–6 (explaining that while exclusivity 
of membership and a lack of transparency were once essential to the success of the 
“club” model of global governance, these factors have brought this model under 
scrutiny in today’s interconnected, globalized world). 
29 See generally Alexandru Grigorescu, Transparency of Intergovernmental 
Organizations: The Roles of Member States, International Bureaucracies and 
Nongovernmental Organizations, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 625 (2007).  Even skeptics of 
traditional approaches to transparency recognize the contribution of multi-
stakeholder models.  See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA 
L. REV. 885, 948 (2006) (recognizing that deliberation involving community groups 
and government officials leads to greater transparency). 
30 See Bäckstrand, supra note 20, at 294–96 (defining “input legitimacy” as 
balanced representation of various stakeholders, and accountability and 
transparency mechanisms to monitor the effectiveness of partnerships and 
“output legitimacy” the effectiveness of partnership networks); see also Klaus Dieter 
Wolf, Private Actors and the Legitimacy of Governance Beyond the State: Conceptional Outlines 
and Empirical Explorations 12–20 (Apr. 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Technical University of Darnstadt, Institute for Political Science), available at 
http://www.politikwissenschaft.tu-darmstadt.de/fileadmin/pg/media/papers 
/civil.pdf (using input and output legitimacy as methods of critically assessing 
the overall legitimacy and effectiveness of governing bodies). 
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legitimacy.31  Keohane and Nye ultimately concluded that “any 
sustainable pattern of governance will have to institutionalize 
channels of contact between international organizations and 
constituencies within civil society.”32
Another critique of civil society involvement in the governance 
of international institutions is the idea that their participation in 
governance undermines and weakens the influence of states.
  Therefore, the broader 
challenge is not just to ensure the accountability of civil society 
groups, but also to harness their potential contribution to the 
overall accountability of the international institutions in which 
they participate. 
33  The 
argument is that civil society participation will undercut the more 
directly representative role served by many state actors.  Some 
observers have claimed that incorporating civil society increases 
the autonomy and independence of these institutions from key 
state actors.34
 
31 See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 614 (noting the importance of transparency and 
participation in legitimizing democratic forms of government); Thomas Risse, 
Transnational Governance and Legitimacy 10 (Feb. 17, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the Freie Universität Berlin Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science Center 
for Transatlantic Foreign and Security Policy), available at http://userpage.fu-
berlin.de/~atasp/texte/tn_governance_benz.pdf (“[I]ncluding non-state actors in 
global governance is also meant to increase the external accountability of states. 
Trisectoral public policy networks and global public private partnerships are 
precisely meant to close the participatory gap identified by critics of international 
regimes.”). 
  Others have suggested that incorporating NGOs in 
32 Keohane & Nye, supra note 2, at 25. 
33 See Bolton, supra note 3, at 217 (suggesting that civil society involvement in 
the international context may decrease state power and even undermine 
democracy by giving intrastate advocates a second opportunity to pose 
arguments that were previously rejected); Duncan B. Hollis, Private Actors in 
Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State 
Sovereignty, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 235, 237 (2002) (noting the argument that 
allowing private actors participate in public international law may erode state 
sovereignty).  See generally Shapiro, supra note 3 (exploring the role played by 
NGOs in administrative decision-making, and suggesting that the distinction 
between governmental and non-governmental actors has been blurred due to 
increased civil society participation). 
34 See Gabriel Casaburi et al., Multilateral Development Banks, Governments, and 
Civil Society: Chiaroscuros in a Triangular Relationship, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 493, 
502–05 (2000) (suggesting that increased civil society participation has placed a 
check on the power of governments and has given institutions a greater role in 
decision-making). 
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these institutions challenges the fundamental concept of 
sovereignty itself.35
On its face, the participation of non-state actors in the 
governance of international institutions would seem to dilute the 
monopoly of state actors over shaping the direction of these 
institutions.  Yet, it is not always the case that including civil 
society actually weakens the role of states in shaping the key 
outcomes of international institutions.  Given the relative 
representation of states and non-state actors within most 
governance structures, it is virtually impossible that the views of 
non-state actors could ever prevail without substantial support 
from at least some states.
 
36
Therefore, while civil society participation could plausibly 
affect the role of some states in shaping key international 
institutions, it is not the case that non-state actors could 
significantly shape these institutions without the support of some 
states.  Perhaps the more reasonable concern is that non-state 
actors would buttress the efforts of a given international institution 
to enhance their own autonomy and authority.
 
37  Yet, civil society 
participation is closely tied to stronger rules in these institutions, 
requiring expanded transparency, and often, accountability.38
 
35 See Jeffrey Andrew Hartwick, Non-Governmental Organizations at United 
Nations-Sponsored World Conferences: A Framework for Participation Reform, 26 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 217, 249–50 (2003) (discussing the argument that NGOs, 
as unelected, extra-national entities, may threaten national sovereignty by making 
“decisions that are not necessarily in the best interest of a nation-state”); Raustiala, 
supra note 18, at 720 (recognizing the argument that civil society participation in 
international institutions may challenge state sovereignty, but ultimately arguing 
that NGO inclusion works to the advantage of states); Raustiala, supra note 2, at 
585 (discussing the argument that the rise of transnational private actors has 
caused a corresponding decline in state power in the international arena). 
  
36 See Thomas Risse-Kappen, Structures of Governance and Transnational 
Relations: What Have We Learned?, in BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: 
NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 280, 
294 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995) (noting that transnational actors must 
depend upon and work with state actors in order to be effective, rather than 
diminish state control over international systems). 
37 See generally MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE 
WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS (2004) (offering an 
overview of international organizations and their effect on global politics, and the 
ways in which increased autonomy allow such organizations to evolve, 
occasionally in unintended ways). 
38 See Volker Rittberger, Global Governance: From ‘Exclusive’ Executive 
Multilateralism to Inclusive, Multipartite Institutions 14 (Eberhard Karls Univ. of 
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Consequently, the proposition that enhanced participation leads to 
greater institutional autonomy is not self-evident.  Indeed, wider 
transparency almost always exposes these institutions to greater 
outside scrutiny. 
Even when non-state actors are able to overcome the views of 
some states within these institutions, it is not immediately obvious 
that civil society representation undermines the capacity of states 
to influence the international arena.  In fact, some scholars argue 
that including NGO participation actually strengthens the ability of 
states to regulate and shape important arenas.39
While some fear that non-state actors might undermine the 
influence of states, others fear that including these actors in formal 
governance jeopardizes the independence of civil society groups, 
thereby undercutting their core comparative advantage.
  Thus, even if civil 
society involvement in governance could challenge the monopoly 
of state influence on a given decision, it might actually enhance the 
capacity of such states, and thereby indirectly serve their interests. 
40  Such 
participation in governance is sometimes viewed as inevitably 
leading to a process of co-optation at the international level, 
through which states shape the views and behavior of non-state 
actors.41  One of the central roles played by civil society groups in 
relation to international institutions is often that of an independent, 
external watchdog, monitoring the operations of the institution.42
 
Tübingen Inst. for Political Sci., Working Paper No. 52, 2008), available at 
http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/uni/spi/taps/tap52.pdf (“The inclusion of actors 
from civil society and the business sector also positively impacts on the 
effectiveness of an institution because it leads to an increased readiness to comply 
with norms and rules.”). 
  
39 See Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 362–63 (noting that NGO involvement in 
international law may “strengthen states when the new international legislation 
promoted by NGOs expands states’ regulatory agendas”); Raustiala, supra note 2, 
at 538 (arguing that NGO participation in international environmental law yields 
many potential benefits for states including political, technical, and informational 
benefits). 
40 See Ottaway, supra note 11, at 266–67 (arguing that incorporating civil 
society groups in international governance may weaken their ability to contribute 
innovative ideas). 
41 See id. at 267. 
42 See Raustiala, supra note 2, at 560–61 (noting the instrumental role that 
NGOs have played in monitoring state compliance with international 
environmental law); Jan Aart Scholte, Civil Society and Democratically Accountable 
Global Governance, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 211, 217–19 (2004) (discussing the 
benefits that civil society organization monitoring has brought to democratic 
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As NGOs gain greater influence through formal structures of 
institutions—as in the United Nations—they are increasingly 
subject to the rules and cultures of those institutions’ 
bureaucracies.43  Multi-stakeholder approaches to governance, at 
their worst, can serve as agents “of co-optation rather than 
representation.”44
Unless one assumes that any engagement with formal 
institutions inevitably compromises the independence of civil 
society groups, it remains plausible that expanded access to 
information and internal deliberations of formal institutions could 
strengthen rather than weaken the watchdog function of civil 
society.  Within many institutions, civil society groups continue to 
play both inside and outside roles and sometimes utilize the 
enhanced transparency of the institution as a point of leverage for 
broader reform.
  Yet, this challenge fundamentally reflects the 
imbalances that can exist within governance structures, and 
suggests the importance of institutional designs that ensure 
effective participation without imposing bureaucratic constraints. 
45  Nonetheless, it is instructive to highlight the 
possibility that civil society will simply become the tool of 
powerful states when contemplating a design of international 
institutions that might reduce such risks of co-optation.46
While critics of civil society participation sometimes fear that 
these non-state actors might challenge the interests of states, their 
greatest contribution to governance may well be to introduce the 
perspectives of diverse societal actors precisely because they hold 
views different than those advanced by powerful states.  These 
views will sometimes reflect the long-term interest of states 
otherwise constrained by short-term political factors, and at other 
 
 
accountability, including increased review of state compliance with constitutions, 
official resolutions, and public declarations). 
43 See Ottaway, supra note 11, at 277 (arguing that increased NGO 
participation within the United Nations has left these organizations shackled by 
bureaucratic rules and divided them into separate categories). 
44 Id. at 267. 
45 See Scholte, supra note 42, at 219 (“Once policy practices are publicly 
visible, civil society associations are in a position to advance democratic 
accountability in global governance through watchdog and evaluation 
activities.”). 
46 See Ottaway, supra note 11, at 267–70 (noting the tendency of global 
corporatism to weaken the contributions of civil society groups, and to subsume 
the agendas of NGOs within the larger agendas of state-actors). 
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times might foster a broader global consensus of stakeholders 
around a common mission that otherwise could not be achieved. 
2.1. Theory Grounded in Twentieth Century Practice 
The views expressed by many of the theorists who remain 
skeptical of significant civil society participation in international 
institutions reflect the prevailing practice of leading twentieth 
century international institutions.  The core international 
institutions founded shortly after World War II remain 
fundamentally inter-governmental bodies.  The way in which 
many scholars in the field conceived of these institutions often 
centered on their role in fostering inter-governmental cooperation.  
Despite reforms at the end of the last century designed to facilitate 
consultation with civil society, these institutions remained forums 
for cooperation among states.47
One of the ironies of the rejection of civil society participation 
in the governance of key international institutions is the important 
role that many of these groups played in the founding of the 
United Nations and other institutions in the first place.  In 1945, 
representatives from as many as forty-two NGOs were invited to 
serve as advisers to the official U.S. delegation at the founding 
conference of the United Nations.
  As a result, the world of twentieth 
century practice, which shaped so much of the literature in the 
field, remained quite limited in terms of the roles that it imagined 
civil society could play within international institutions. 
48  In total, 1,200 voluntary 
associations were present at the founding of the United Nations.49
The United Nations Charter initially had no provision even for 
any formal consultation with civil society groups.  Article 71 was 
  
Yet, the extensive involvement of civil society organizations in the 
founding conference of the United Nations after World War II did 
not lead to non-state actors being given a meaningful role within 
the U.N. structure. 
 
47 See Peter Willetts, From “Consultative Arrangements” to “Partnership”: The 
Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 191, 191–
92 (2000) (describing the evolution of consultative arrangements between NGOs 
and the United Nations); see also Casaburi et al., supra note 34, at 496–505 
(discussing the increased participation of multilateral development banks in 
global governance). 
48 AKIRA IRIYE, GLOBAL COMMUNITY: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 43 (2002). 
49 Alger, supra note 5, at 93. 
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only incorporated into the Charter after aggressive lobbying by the 
World Federation of Trade Unions.  It provided that:  “The 
Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are 
concerned with matters within its competence.”50  The Economic 
and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) defined NGOs as “[a]ny 
international organization which is not established by 
intergovernmental agreement,” and only admitted national NGOs 
to consultative status with the permission of their home 
government.51
Although ECOSOC became the primary locus for consultations 
with NGOs within the United Nations, it is one of the weakest of 
the core U.N. organs, with much less influence than the Security 
Council or the General Assembly.  Yet, even within ECOSOC, civil 
society groups were not viewed as full observers:  “A clear 
distinction is drawn in the Charter of the United Nations between 
participation without vote in the deliberations of the Council and 
the arrangements for consultation.”
 
52  Unlike NGOs, those 
members of international organizations and governments who 
served as observers were permitted to participate in deliberations 
as part of decision-making.53  In contrast, non-state actors might 
have been consulted, but did not have a role in the deliberations of 
the United Nations.54
As with the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions 
opted for a governance model that was limited only to states.  The 
governance structures of both the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund consisted exclusively of states with 
voting shares weighted based on a quota system that was meant to 
 
 
50 U.N. Charter art. 71. 
51 E.S.C. Res. 288B(X) of February 27, 1950 was adopted with amendments by 
E.S.C. Res. 1296(XIV), ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1968/1296 (May 23, 1968). 
52 E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1996/31 (July 25, 1996); see also 
Alger, supra note 5, at 95–96 (discussing the poor design of consultative status 
rules for NGOs working with ECOSOC and the resistance of some UN member 
states to increased NGO participation). 
53 See Willetts, supra note 47, at 191–92 (noting that nonmember states or 
intergovernmental organizations could, as “observers,” participate in the 
decision-making process, but NGOs are not allowed that level of participation).  
54 See id. (describing the limited roles NGOs were allowed within the United 
Nations). 
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reflect each country’s share of the global economy.55
In the last decade of the twentieth century, the expansion of 
consultative processes within leading international institutions 
demonstrated the possibility and limits of reform within an older 
generation of institutions.  Challenges to the effectiveness and the 
legitimacy of many of these institutions catalyzed reform at the 
same time that non-state actors were expanding their involvement 
in many international arenas.  These institutions responded by 
moving in the direction of greater openness to consultation with 
external stakeholders. 
  Neither 
institution seriously contemplated a significant role for non-state 
actors in the governance structure, nor did they initially establish a 
structure for consultation with civil society. 
Unlike the United Nations, the World Bank did not have a 
formal role for NGOs in its early years.  Before 1981, there was no 
formal mechanism for the World Bank to consult with NGOs.  In 
1981, the Bank developed Operational Policy Note (10.05), which 
outlined potential benefits from more direct engagement with civil 
society groups, and suggested the possible involvement of NGOs 
in project identification, design, financing, implementation, and 
evaluation of projects.56  In 1989, the Bank adopted another 
operational directive (14.70) that outlined procedures for 
consulting with NGOs on specific bank projects at different stages 
of development. 57
Although the World Bank formed a Bank-NGO committee in 
1981 to engage with fifteen NGO leaders, only in the 1990s did the 
Bank take a much more active role in soliciting broader civil 
society feedback on its work.
 
58
 
55 NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND THEIR 
BORROWERS 22–23 (2006). 
  The shift was catalyzed largely by 
the findings of the independent Morse Commission.  In the wake 
56 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and Non-Governmental 
Organizations, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 623, 625 (1992) (discussing the evolution of the 
World Bank’s policy of participation with NGOs and the benefits of Operational 
Policy Note (10.05)). 
57 Id. at 626. 
58 See generally Jane G. Covey, Is Critical Cooperation Possible?  Influencing the 
World Bank Through Operational Collaboration and Policy Dialogue, in THE STRUGGLE 
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 81 
(Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998) (discussing World Bank-NGO 
project collaborations and the increased involvement of NGOs in Bank projects). 
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of the Commission’s findings, Washington-based NGOs testified 
before Congress that they would “oppose funds to the Bank 
unless” it created an independent body to respond to complaints 
by citizens and civil society groups in countries where Bank 
projects operated.59  As a result of the Commission, there was 
growing interest on the part of the U.S. Congress and international 
NGOs in developing new mechanisms of consultation and 
accountability, such as the creation of an independent Inspection 
Panel.60  In 1993, the U.S. Congress linked its contribution to the 
replenishment of the Bank’s International Development 
Association funds to the creation of an independent Inspection 
Panel, and the Bank created the Panel that same year.61
Amidst these growing pressures for accountability to local 
stakeholders, the World Bank also endorsed an innovative Report 
of the Participatory Development Learning Group in 1994.  One of 
the key findings of the Learning Group was that:  “There is 
significant evidence that participation can in many circumstances 
improve the quality, effectiveness, and sustainability of projects, 
and strengthen ownership and commitment of government and 
stakeholders.”
 
62  The report proved to be a precursor to the 
subsequent expansion of the Bank’s consultative processes with 
NGOs.  In 1995, the Bank-NGO Committee created six regional 
bodies and in 1997, the Bank created civil society liaison staff at all 
of its seventy-two resident missions around the world.63
Despite these steps toward greater openness to civil society 
consultation, it remained extremely rare for any high-level policy 
 
 
59 Lori Udall, The World Bank and Public Accountability: Has Anything 
Changed?, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND 
GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 391, 402 (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998). 
60 See Fox & Brown, supra note 26, at 8 (explaining how the findings of the 
Morse Commission inspired Congress and international NGOs to push for 
broader policy changes at the World Bank, including the establishment of an 
Inspection Panel that could accept complaints from project-affected people). 
61 See WOODS, supra note 55, at 28 (explaining how the U.S. Congress used the 
threat of withholding funds to pressure the World Bank into creating the 
Inspection Panel). 
62 THE WORLD BANK, ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING ENGAGEMENT 
BETWEEN THE WORLD BANK AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS 6 (2005) (quoting the 
1994 final report of the World Bank’s Participatory Development Learning 
Group). 
63 See WOODS, supra note 55, at 170 (discussing the influence of NGOs in 
shaping the World Bank debt strategy). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss2/4
GARTNER.DOC 1/13/2011  7:04 PM 
2010] BEYOND THE MONOPOLY OF STATES 613 
decisions by the World Bank board to reflect substantial 
consultation with NGOs, and there was still no role for civil society 
in formal governance.64  Civil society input remains discretionary, 
and the central debate over governance reform within the World 
Bank continues to be focused on the shares of votes between 
different state actors.  As one scholar explained, consultation does 
not necessarily imply actual participation in governance it is“seen 
as a proxy for participation” and thus “restricted to consultation by 
request.”65
Just as the World Bank faced growing pressures to expand its 
consultations with non-state actors, so too did the United Nations, 
as the role of NGOs grew in the context of environmental and 
other major U.N. conferences.  ECOSOC remained the central body 
with which non-state actors could engage, if not fully participate.
 
66  
By the 1970s, NGOs were allowed to participate formally in Special 
Sessions on development and other issues.67  Although NGOs 
initially had fewer rights to participate in conferences than in 
ECOSOC, by the 1980s, these groups achieved an expanded role in 
international conferences.68  Still, there remained substantial 
restrictions on the role that civil society groups were allowed to 
play in these settings.69
 
64 See THE WORLD BANK, CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT: REVIEW OF FISCAL YEARS 
2005 AND 2006, 67 (2006) (observing that while there is growing operational 
collaboration between the World Bank and NGOs, the Bank still needs to make 
changes to engage with civil society groups more effectively). 
 
65 Casaburi et al., supra note 34, at 503; see also Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The 
Impact of Civil Society on the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Trade Organization: The Case of the World Bank, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 399, 
406 (2001) (noting that consultation fails to provide NGOs with any concrete 
influence over decisions made by the World Bank). 
66 See generally Alger, supra note 5, at 95 (discussing the varying roles and 
duties given to NGOs according to their consultative status within the ECOSOC). 
67 See Peter Willetts, The Rules of the Game: The United Nations and Civil Society, 
in WHOSE WORLD IS IT ANYWAY?: CIVIL SOCIETY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE 
MULTILATERAL FUTURE 247, 273 (John W. Foster & Anita Anand eds., 1999) 
(discussing the participation of NGOs in Special Sessions beginning in the 1970s). 
68 See Willetts, supra note 47, at 193 (noting that by the mid-1980s, NGOs 
“increasingly had a higher political status and better participation opportunities” 
at international conferences than in ECOSOC). 
69 See Ronnie D. Lipschutz & Cathleen Fogel, “Regulation for the Rest of Us?” 
Global Civil Society and the Privatization of Transnational Regulation, in THE 
EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 115, 116 (Rodney Bruce 
Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002) (noting that while non-state social actors 
were allowed “access to and influence within a number of intergovernmental 
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A more ambitious shift toward multi-stakeholder governance 
was contemplated by high-level advisors to the U.N. but was never 
realized in practice.  This vision was articulated by the High-Level 
Panel on U.N. Civil Society Relations led by former Brazilian 
President Cardoso in its 1994 report “We the Peoples:  Civil 
Society, the United Nations, and Global Governance.”70  The report 
called for the managed inclusion of civil society groups in the 
processes of the General Assembly and also for expanded 
engagement with the Security Council.71  In order to implement 
these recommendations an ECOSOC resolution called on the 
General Assembly to establish mechanisms for participation by 
NGOs in “all areas of the work of the United Nations.”72  Yet, there 
was substantial resistance by a number of Security Council 
members, especially to the idea of allowing the General Assembly 
to consider expanding NGO participation in other organs of the 
United Nations.73  As a result, a subgroup of the General Assembly 
Working Group on Reform of the U.N. system, which was 
established to take up the question of NGO access to U.N. 
proceedings, was unable to reach any agreement on the group’s 
mandate or meaningfully move the agenda forward.74
 
institutions such as [ECOSOC], for the most part there were serious restrictions in 
terms of what they could say or do in these forums”). 
 
70 U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and 
Global Governance: Rep. of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil 
Society Relations, U.N. Doc. A/58/817, at 70 (June 7, 2004) (“Through assertive use 
of the moral leadership and convening power of the Secretary-General, the 
Organization could champion a new vision of global governance throughout the 
international system . . . .”). 
71 Id. at 16–18 (detailing proposals that would increase civil society input to 
the General Assembly and the Security Council). 
72 Willetts, supra note 47, at 198 (analyzing the debate over the level of 
involvement NGOs were given in the United Nations, and explaining that the 
original agreement on NGO involvement did not apply to the General Assembly, 
but ECOSOC recommended that it be discussed later). 
73 See Barbara Adams, ECOSOC and NGOs: A Review of the Review, 1 CIVIL 
SOCIETY ENGAGING MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS: AT THE CROSSROADS 8, 11 (1999), 
available at http://www.fimcivilsociety.org/en/library/FIMForum1999.pdf 
(noting that the United States and European Union were against NGO 
involvement in every facet of the United Nations). 
74 See Stanley, supra note 19, at 7 (recounting the history of NGOs’ attempts to 
play a role in global governance and decision-making). 
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Today, NGOs are still not in a position to formally deliberate 
alongside United Nations Member States in policy-setting arenas.75  
The backlash to expanded civil society participation reflected the 
fears on the part of some U.N. delegates of losing a nation-state 
monopoly on decision-making.  By 1998, there was a movement to 
further curtail NGO access to U.N. processes.76  In no case did 
NGOs become full participants in core structures of the U.N. 
system in the sense of having a vote and the ability to formally 
negotiate with state actors within these still primarily 
intergovernmental forums.77
3. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY INSTITUTIONS 
  Despite recent shifts toward greater 
consultation with civil society at the United Nations and the World 
Bank, each of these institutions remained bodies in which states 
deliberate and decide without meaningful participation by non-
state actors. 
The emergence of twenty-first century institutions that are 
adopting multi-stakeholder models of governance and expanding 
the role of civil society creates an opening for new ways of 
thinking about the governance of international institutions.  This 
Section highlights these new institutions, their approach to multi-
stakeholder governance, and the challenge it poses to inherited 
assumptions about the proper roles of states and non-state actors 
in the international arena.  While many scholars still reject the 
wisdom of civil society participation in governance, the experience 
of these new institutions points toward the potential for a new 
approach that encompasses the emerging twenty-first century role 
of societal actors as partners with states in responding to pressing 
global challenges.  Civil society groups are among a range of non-
state actors that are now centrally involved in the formal 
governance of diverse institutions and are transforming the nature 
of the debate around many key global challenges.  In many cases, 
these new institutions have involved civil society in the formal 
 
75 See id. at 18 (stressing the importance of fostering a clear understanding of 
the relationship between NGOs and the United Nations to create a sustainable 
partnership). 
76 See ANN FLORINI, THE COMING DEMOCRACY: NEW RULES FOR RUNNING A NEW 
WORLD 202 (2005). 
77 See id. at 206–07. 
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governance structure of the institution in ways that go beyond the 
consultation model of the United Nations and the World Bank. 
There has been relatively little scholarly work on many of these 
new institutions established in the last decade in sectors such as 
global health, education, and agricultural development, which 
have introduced new approaches to governance.78  Much of the 
valuable literature highlighting multi-stakeholder models of 
governance within international institutions has focused on the 
historical legacy of twentieth century institutions such as the 
International Labor Organization (“ILO”), which includes non-
state actors selected by states in its governance structure.79  There is 
relatively little existing research in this area looking across 
institutions and sectors.80
At the same time, there is an important literature on global 
administrative law, which focuses on the role of procedural 
requirements within international institutions as a means to 
 
 
78 See generally Kenneth W. Abbott, Innovations in Global Health and the Global 
Governance System, WALL SUMMER INST. (2007) (analyzing changes in health 
systems through the lens of public and private global governance systems, 
including the roles of NGOs); Sonja Bartsch, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, in GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE AND THE FIGHT AGAINST 
HIV/AIDS 146 (Wolfgang Hein et al. eds., 2007) (examining key actors in global 
health, and analyzing the patterns of conflict and cooperation in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS and global health governance); KENT BUSE, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT 
INST., EDUCATION FOR ALL—FAST TRACK INITIATIVE: REVIEW OF THE GOVERNANCE 
AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES (2005), available at http://www.hlfhealthmdgs.org 
/HLF4Tunis/Education%20for%20All%20FTI%20materials/EFAFTIGovernanceE
valuation.pdf (reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the governance 
structures used by the Fast Track Initiative, an organization whose goal is to bring 
about universal primary school completion). 
79 See Steve Charnovitz, The Emergence of Democratic Participation in Global 
Governance (Paris 1919), 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 45, 64 (2003) (describing the 
role of non-state actors in the International Labour Organization).  See generally 
Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: 
Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649 (2006) (explaining the 
ILO’s preeminent profile in the debate of global governance, and the efficacy of its 
governance structure); Faina Milman-Sivan, Representativity, Civil Society, and the 
EU Social Dialogue: Lessons from the International Labor Organization, 16 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 311 (2009) (discussing representation in EU social dialogue 
and the lessons that can be learned from ILO). 
80 See generally Magdalena Bexell et al., Democracy in Global Governance: The 
Promises and Pitfalls of Transnational Actors, 16 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 81 (2010) 
(examining the organizational structures of international organizations and 
identifying a need for research that explores expanded participation in global 
governance). 
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improving responsiveness and accountability of these 
institutions.81  Although this literature clearly recognizes the 
emerging role of hybrid institutions involving non-state actors, it 
focuses on enhancing the accountability of international 
institutions through procedures adopted from the context of 
administrative law.82  It particularly highlights the requirements of 
expanded transparency, participation through notice and 
comment, and the requirement of reason-giving in the context of 
decision-making.83
Early in the twenty-first century, a range of new institutions 
adopted multi-stakeholder forms of governance that involved civil 
society actors as full participants.  A number of these institutions 
focused on global health financing, despite the fact that finance has 
been viewed as a “least likely” case for civil society participation.
  The administrative law vision appears largely 
compatible with expanded consultation with NGOs within 
international institutions without necessarily requiring full civil 
society participation in multi-stakeholder governance.  
Nonetheless, many of its insights regarding the importance of 
transparency and access to information, among other procedural 
standards, remain extremely valuable to thinking about the design 
of multi-stakeholder institutions. 
84  
Launched in 2000, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization (“GAVI”), initiated a new era for the multi-
stakeholder approach to governance.85
 
81 See generally Benedict Kingsbury & Lorenzo Casini, Global Administrative 
Law Dimensions of International Organizations Law (Inst. for Int’l L. and Just., 
Working Paper No. 2009/9, 2009) (arguing that the use of global administrative 
law mechanisms strengthens the law of international organizations). 
  When GAVI was 
established it was somewhat unique in the significant role that it 
82 See Kingsbury et al., supra note 2, at 38–40 (explaining that global 
administrative law techniques allow for transparency in international 
organizations so that other nations can express their opinions). 
83 See Benedict Kingsbury et al., Foreword: Global Governance as 
Administration—National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 
68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 8 (2005) (noting the effect of global administrative 
law to affect accountability through open procedural mechanisms, which allow 
broader public participation). 
84 See Kal Raustiala, States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions, 
41 INT’L STUD. Q. 719, 734 (1997). 
85 See generally GAVI Alliance, Innovative Partnership, http://www 
.gavialliance.org/about/in_partnership/index.php (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) 
(summarizing the objectives of the Alliance’s multi-stakeholder partnership and 
the unique contributions of the individual members). 
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provided to non-state actors such as partner foundations, the 
private sector, and technical experts.86  The GAVI Alliance Board 
sets overall policies and monitors programs.  The Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation holds one of four “renewable” seats on the GAVI 
Alliance Board.  In addition, there are several other seats for non-
state actors among the twelve rotating seats on the board.  Of 
these, one is designated for civil society groups while the others are 
allocated to research and technical health institutes, the developing 
country vaccine industry, and the industrialized country vaccine 
industry.87
In 2005, the GAVI Alliance Board determined that it needed to 
further strengthen the participation of civil society constituencies 
in its governance and programs, and allocated expanded resources 
to enhance civil society representation at the country level.  In 2010, 
the GAVI Partners forum created the GAVI Alliance Civil Society 
Constituency, a group of civil society representatives, to support 
members of GAVI’s governance bodies in their responses related to 
governance functions.
 
88  In addition, GAVI created the position of 
a Communications Focal Point for the civil society constituency in 
order to support wider participation and improved 
communication within the constituency.89
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, 
launched in 2002, went even further than the GAVI model in terms 
of broadening multi-stakeholder participation in its governance 
structure.
 
90
 
86 Id. (highlighting that the “added ingredient” to GAVI’s objective is to 
strengthen the engagement of civil society organizations in order to broaden the 
Alliance’s perspective and to ensure that government and international actors are 
acting in the best interest of the people they serve). 
  The Global Fund provides for a wider representation 
of civil society groups and a greater role in its governance structure 
87 GAVI Alliance, The GAVI Alliance Board, http://www.gavialliance.org 
/about/governance/boards/index.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2010) (charting the 
different groups affiliated with the Alliance). 
88 GAVI Alliance, Civil Society Organisations, http://www.gavialliance.org 
/about/in_partnership/cso/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (outlining the Alliance’s 
“Call to Action” in strengthening its engagement with civil society organizations). 
89 Id. 
90 See Bartsch, supra note 78, at 146 (discussing the creation of the Global 
Fund, the strengths and weaknesses of its structured partnership, and its impact 
on general discourses in global health). 
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for developing country governments.91  In addition to 
incorporating civil society representation from the global North 
and South, the Global Fund also includes the most directly affected 
communities of people living with AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria 
on its Board.92
With each of these civil society representatives, a 
communications focal point plays a key role in organizing the 
constituency and facilitating the selection process for the board 
member, the alternate board member, and the wider delegation for 
meetings of the board.  The communications focal point serves as 
the primary convener of internal deliberations within the 
delegation and also as a liaison to other delegations and the 
Secretariat in order to ensure a steady flow of information to 
members of the delegation.  The nominations for the board 
member for the affected communities delegation is conducted 
through an open call for applicants based on candidates’ capacity 
to commit their time and participate in the work of the board.
 
93
Instead of having a single representative from a given 
foundation or civil society group, the constituency model of the 
Global Fund established a full-fledged delegation designed to 
reflect greater diversity within each sector.
  
For other delegations, the communications focal point arranges a 
nomination and selection process that includes all the members of 
the delegation and wider stakeholders actively involved in the 
constituency. 
94
 
91 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Toward a Richer Institutionalism for International Law 
and Policy, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 9, 23 (2005) (highlighting the Global Fund’s 
structured partnership, which includes governments, international organizations, 
Northern and Southern NGOs, philanthropic foundations, businesses, and people 
living with diseases). 
  In addition, the 
92 See Bartsch, supra note 78, at 152 (noting that the “affected communities”—
CSOs representing people living with the diseases—secured a voting seat on the 
Executive Board after demonstrating that such move would ensure that the views 
of the people are represented and thereby strengthen the Global Fund’s 
reputation). 
93 Call for Nominations for Members of the Global Fund Communities Delegation 
2011 Through 2013, WORLD CARE COUNCIL (Nov. 6, 2010 4:58AM), 
http://www.worldcarecouncil.org/content/call-nominations-gf-communities-
delegation (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (calling for nominations for the Global Fund 
Communities Delegation, and citing the criteria for which the selection will be 
based on).  
94 Abbott, supra note 91, at 23 (”The Fund promotes parallel forms of 
collaboration in recipient countries.”). 
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Fund’s governance structure established a donor bloc, including 
foundations and the private sector, and a recipient bloc, including 
civil society, and recipient countries.  Major decisions of the Global 
Fund are usually based on consensus.95  However, in the absence 
of consensus, concurring majorities are required such that both the 
donor bloc and the recipient bloc must demonstrate two-thirds 
support of those present in order to approve a controversial 
decision.96  Civil society also plays a unique leadership role on the 
Board since the roles of Chair and Vice-Chair are distributed and 
alternate between stakeholders from the donor and recipient 
blocs.97  Civil society representatives have in the recent past served 
as the Vice-Chair of the board of the Global Fund.98
Beyond global health, a number of other important sectors, 
such as education and agriculture, have adopted this multi-
stakeholder approach to governance in recent years.  The 
Education for All—Fast Track Initiative (“FIT”), like the Global 
Fund, emerged out of the leadership of the G8 early in the twenty-
first century.  It was established to accelerate progress to achieve 
universal primary education by leveraging resources and 
coordinating donor efforts in countries with strong national 
education plans which lacked adequate resources.
 
99
 
95 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria By-laws, art. 7 
(as amended May 1, 2009), available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents 
/TGF_Bylaws_en.pdf [hereinafter The Global Fund to Fight AIDS] (outlining the 
method by which decisions are made within the Fund). 
  Initially 
governed by a broad partnership meeting and, subsequently by a 
steering group it recently adopted a multi-stakeholder governance 
structure for its board that moves it closer to the model of the 
Global Fund.  In 2010, as part of a broader reform process, the FTI 
transformed its governance structure to include an equal number 
of developing countries as donors on the Board and extended three 
96 Id. 
97 Bartsch, supra note 78, at 152–55 (describing the structure of the Global 
Fund’s executive board, and noting that civil service organizations are the second 
most influential members on the board). 
98 See, e.g., HÉLÈNE ROSSERT-BLAVIER, THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, 
TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA, SELF-ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL STATEMENT FROM 
THE VICE CHAIR OF THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA 9 
(2005), available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/Auto-evaluation 
_Helene_Rossert-Blavier_en.pdf. 
99 Buse, supra note 78, at 2–3 (explaining the goals and aims of the Fast Track 
Initiative). 
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seats to civil society organizations.100  The FTI unified control over 
its trust funds under the Board, eliminating exclusively donor 
governance of its core resources.101 
In the agricultural sector, the recently created Global 
Agriculture and Food Security Program (“GAFSP”) also reflects 
direct civil society involvement in governance.  The steering 
committee of the GAFSP includes the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation—along with several governments—as one of five 
voting members who were also the original contributors to the 
GAFSP trust fund.102  In addition, the GAFSP steering committee 
includes three non-voting civil society representatives who have 
the same status as representatives from other multilateral 
institutions. The civil society seats are specifically allocated with 
two set aside for Southern NGO representation from different 
regions, and one seat provided for Northern NGO representation, 
from a country that is a member of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”).103
An emerging twenty-first century model of civil society 
participation in the governance of international institutions reflects 
a shift away from mere consultation toward full membership for 
non-state actors in formal governance structures.  Pioneered in the 
field of global health, similar models have since been translated 
into other sectors, including education and agriculture.  What 
unites these diverse institutions is their commitment to multi-
stakeholder governance, in contrast to primarily inter-
governmental bodies. 
 
 
100 See EDUCATION FOR ALL—FAST TRACK INITIATIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
MEETING, KEY DECISIONS (May 2010), available at http://www.educationfasttrack 
.org/media/library/Secure/Board_Documents_May-2010/Final_Board_Key 
_Decisions_Bod-May-2010.pdf (adopting changes to the current Board 
composition to affect greater equity and inclusion). 
101 Id.  
102 See GLOBAL AGRIC. & FOOD SEC. PROGRAM, GLOBAL AGRICULTURE AND FOOD 
SECURITY PROGRAM (GAFSP) GOVERNANCE DOCUMENT, 2(i) (adopted May 14, 2010), 
available at http://www.gafspfund.org/gafsp/sites/gafspfund.org/files 
/Documents/GovernanceDocument.pdf (listing members of the steering 
committee ). 
103 See id. at 2(i)(B)(d) (allocating three seats on the steering committee to civil 
society organizations). 
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3.1. From Governance to Impact 
With this new generation of institutions, there is also new data 
to suggest that multi-stakeholder models of governance can 
contribute to better deliberation and greater institutional 
effectiveness.  Some of the advantages of civil society participation 
in governance appear to be higher levels of public credibility, 
institutional transparency, deeper deliberation within the 
institution, stronger connections to diverse stakeholders outside of 
the institution, and higher levels of overall institutional 
effectiveness. 
Civil society groups often have great credibility in key areas in 
which international institutions operate.  According to surveys 
measuring public trust in government institutions since 2000, non-
governmental organizations perform better than governments, 
business, and the media in providing credible information on 
environment, health, and human rights.104  On the issue of public 
credibility, NGOs are surpassing all other institutions in many 
parts of the world.105  Many inter-governmental organizations now 
face persistent criticism for their perceived lack of accountability 
and responsiveness.106  The legitimacy of the objectives and norms 
put forward by international institutions are often linked to the 
perceived legitimacy of the institutions themselves and their 
governance structures.107
 
104 See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 62, at 21 (commenting that NGOs/CSOs 
enjoy more public confidence than other institutions). 
 
105 See TERRY MACDONALD, GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY: POWER AND 
REPRESENTATION BEYOND LIBERAL STATES 3 (2008) (“The growing influence of 
NGOs is underpinned by their perceived legitimacy, and this derives to some 
degree from their claims to serve as democratic representative of global 
peoples.”). 
106 See BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 37, at 170–72 (criticizing 
international organizations for a lack of accountability and transparency, 
exacerbated by the fact that member nations often have a vested interest in 
preserving the status quo); Asher Alkoby, Global Networks and International 
Environmental Lawmaking: A Discourse Approach, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 377, 402 (2008) 
(discussing this criticism and concluding that “NGOs are held accountable 
differently, and sometimes more effectively, than states because their actions are 
monitored more directly through internal accountability.”). 
107 See, e.g., Lars Thomann, The ILO, Tripartism, and NGOs: Do Too Many Cooks 
Really Spoil the Broth?, in CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE: A CURE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT? 71, 73 (Jens Steffek et al. eds., 
2008) (“The ILO and its tripartite structure can . . . claim a high level of legitimacy, 
because the active participation of non-governmental actors is institutionalized.”). 
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In terms of institutional transparency, the example of the 
Global Fund helps to give context to the broader observation that 
civil society participation improves the overall transparency of 
international institutions.108  Civil society participation in the 
Global Fund’s board contributed to the adoption of enhanced 
transparency requirements, through the Global Fund Documents 
Policy, and the adoption of a requirement for a formal independent 
evaluation of the Fund.109  Additionally, civil society involvement 
on the Board has contributed to a substantial revision of the 
guidelines for ensuring effective multi-stakeholder involvement in 
country-level processes, proposals, and program 
implementation.110
Involving civil society groups in the formal decision-making 
process within international institutions can sometimes lead to 
more robust deliberation, and thereby contribute to improved 
decision-making.
 
111  Looking at the World Trade Organization, 
Dan Esty highlights the contribution of competing ideas offered by 
civil society which can be applied to many other institutions:  “An 
NGO-enriched WTO decision process would offer better 
competition for national governments in the search for optimal 
policies.”112
 
108 See Grigorescu, supra note 29, at 625 (suggesting that intergovernmental 
organizations can become more accountable and legitimate through increased 
transparency). 
  The expansion of participation in the international 
environmental arena has been seen to provide particular benefits in 
109 See THE INT’L CTR. FOR RES. ON WOMEN, CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN 
GLOBAL FUND GOVERNANCE: WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?  PRELIMINARY 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 2–3 (2004), available at http://www.theglobalfund.org 
/documents/library/studies/position_papers/PP_PS2_full.pdf (commenting 
that civil society has played a significant role in the decision-making and policy 
choices of the Global Fund). 
110 See THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, AN 
EVOLVING PARTNERSHIP: THE GLOBAL FUND AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST 
AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA 11 (2007), available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/publications/other/evolvingpartnership/ 
(recommending several strategies designed to insure greater civil society 
participation in program implementation and decision-making activities). 
111 See Alkoby, supra note 106, at 388 (discussing the efficacy of a transparent 
and inclusive negotiating process, particularly in multi-actor situations). 
112 Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade 
Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 123, 137 
(1998). 
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policy formulation because of the specific expertise of non-state 
actors.113
In addition, civil society actors can sometimes provide a long-
term perspective on certain challenges precisely because they are 
less constrained than many state actors.  Less affected by the 
demands and limitations of shorter-term political bargaining in 
which governments must constantly engage, civil society groups 
can often afford to take a longer-term view of important policy 
questions.  NGOs seek to compete for the public conscience, and 
prod governments to consider broader perspectives and focus on 
pressing transnational issues.
 
114
Civil society can also foster deliberation beyond the boundaries 
of the boardrooms of international institutions.  By communicating 
with local-stakeholders and shaping global media interest, non-
state actors can function as a “‘transmission belt’ between a global 
citizenry and the institutions of global governance.”
 
115  Civil 
society groups can transport issues and concerns from local 
stakeholders that might not otherwise reach relevant international 
institutions.116
 
113 See Raustiala, supra note 2, at 558–59 (explaining that one of the benefits is 
that NGOs devote substantial efforts and resources to research and development 
which afford governments reasonably accurate, efficacious, and creative policy 
advice). 
  Even when the arguments of non-state actors do 
not prevail within these institutions, the incorporation of civil 
society groups in the governance of international institutions can 
114 See Ann M. Florini, Transnational Civil Society, in GLOBAL CITIZEN ACTION 
29 (Michael Edwards & John Gaventa eds., 2001). 
115 Jens Steffek & Patrizia Nanz, Emergent Patterns of Civil Society Participation 
in Global and European Governance, in CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN 
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A CURE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT? 1, 3 (Jens Steffek 
et al. eds., 2008); see also Bexell et al., supra note 80, at 86–87 (noting that NGOs and 
other transnational actors responsive to citizens as part of their design are thus 
more able to integrate “citizen concerns into the debate and onto the agenda”). 
116 See Patrizia Nanz & Jens Steffek, Deliberation and Democracy in Global 
Governance: The Role of Civil Society, in PARTICIPATION FOR SUSTAINABILITY IN TRADE 
61, 61 (Sophie Thoyer & Benoît Martimort-Asso eds., 2007) (arguing that 
deliberation between civil society and international organizations “may enhance 
the rationality and legitimacy of political decisions made beyond the nation 
state”); see also Michael Zürn, Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The 
EU and Other International Institutions, 6 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 183, 198 (2000) 
(discussing the power of NGOs to form networks crossing through national 
borders). 
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expand deliberation beyond the institution itself to a broader array 
of stakeholders engaged in the policy dialogue.117
Another important reason for including civil society in the 
governance of international institutions is the possibility that their 
participation can enhance the impact of a given institution in 
implementing its programs and advancing its mission.
 
118  In the 
context of increasingly complex global challenges, the capacity for 
international institutions to solve problems is likely to become an 
increasingly important test of their legitimacy.  Although it is a 
difficult issue to definitively resolve, there is a growing body of 
evidence that strongly suggests that more participatory approaches 
can yield better results, particularly in the field of development.119
There is substantial evidence for this conclusion concerning the 
link between civil society participation and institutional 
effectiveness from the World Bank.
 
120  A 1998 study of World 
Bank-supported projects found that a majority of projects 
demonstrated the “potential for success because their preparation 
and early implementation . . . are highly participatory.”121
 
117 See THE ADVISORY GROUP, CIVIL SOCIETY AND AID EFFECTIVENESS: A 
SYNTHESIS OF ADVISORY GROUP REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS AND RELATED PROCESSES 
JANUARY–DECEMBER 2007, at 6 (2008), available at http://siteresources 
.worldbank.org/ACCRAEXT/Resources/4700790-1208545462880/AG-CS-
Synthisis-of-Consultations.pdf (commenting that NGOs are perceived as being a 
natural outgrowth of societies with free association of individuals); Steffek & 
Nanz, supra note 115, at 28 (stating that CSOs improve the accessibility of 
international governance, but are not considered to have a strong and vibrant 
role). 
  Another 
study of participatory processes in Bank-assisted projects 
completed in 2001 concluded that “participation of primary and 
secondary stakeholders (including CSOs) increased significantly 
during the mid-1990s, and the resulting benefits have been 
118 See Liesbet Steer & Cecilie Wathne, Donor Financing of Basic Education: 
Opportunities and Constraints, 30 INT’L J. EDUC. DEV. 472, 476 (2010) (noting the 
success of civil society involvement in catalyzing resources for the Global Fund 
for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria). 
119 See Kennedy M. Maranga, The Evolving Role of NGOs in Global 
Governance 8 (July 28, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1650163 (discussing the 
increased legitimacy and effectiveness of NGOs when allowing themselves to be 
held accountable to the public). 
120 See Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 65, at 411 (arguing that the World 
Bank’s policy can be greatly shifted by a system of accountability to civil society). 
121 CHRISTOPHER GIBBS ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, NONGOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD BANK-SUPPORTED PROJECTS: A REVIEW 32 (1999). 
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significant.”122  A more recent study by the Bank found that civil 
society consultation in the development of country assistance 
strategies could improve the overall quality of these strategies.123  
Analysis of the World Bank’s portfolio performance reports also 
indicates that NGO involvement can lower the risk of poor 
performance and that civil society participation can have a 
significant impact on effectiveness.124
Since a strong and engaged civil society has been found to 
improve the delivery of public services, it is not surprising that 
more participatory approaches to service delivery often yield 
substantial improvements.
 
125  Some of the best aid projects that 
demonstrate a capacity to improve the delivery of services in the 
public sector involve civil society participation.126  According to 
one recent study, examining projects in 49 countries, projects were 
successful 62% of the time when participation was a goal.  
Conversely, only 10% were successful when participation was not 
a goal.127
 
122 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 62, at 7. 
  One of the strongest reasons for the inclusion of civil 
society groups in the governance of many twenty-first century 
international institutions is their potential to contribute to resource 
mobilization.  Many of the institutions with the highest levels of 
civil society participation in governance—in areas such as global 
123 See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK-CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT: REVIEW OF 
FISCAL YEARS 2002–2004, at 53 (2005) (commenting that cooperation between the 
World Bank and civil society could lead to greater development aid efficiency). 
124 See Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 65, at 411 (concluding that the World 
Bank’s own reports indicate improved efficiency through NGO involvement). 
125 See THE WORLD BANK, ASSESSING AID: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T, AND 
WHY 3 (1998) (“An active civil society improves public services.  One good idea that 
many projects have supported in recent years is a participatory approach to 
service delivery, often resulting in huge improvements.  The best aid projects 
support initiatives that change the way the public sector does business.”); see also 
Kent Buse & Gill Walt, The World Health Organization and Global Public-Private 
Health Partnerships: In Search of ‘Good’ Global Health Governance, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 169, 174 (Michael R. Reich ed., 2002). 
126 See THE ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 117, at 8 (“As CSOs develop 
relationships of trust with communities through the delivery of particular 
programs (whether government-initiated or not), they can go further to empower 
communities to seek out a full range of services from their governments.”). 
127 Jonathan Isham et al., Does Participation Improve Performance? Establishing 
Causality with Subjective Data, 9 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 175, 185–86 (1995). 
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health—have been among the most successful in the last decade in 
mobilizing an expansion of overall institutional resources.128
One of the strongest examples of the correlation between 
broader participatory governance and increased performance is the 
Global Fund, both in terms of its resource mobilization and its 
programmatic achievements.
 
129  Within a few years of its creation, 
the Global Fund was already a multi-billion dollar a year venture 
because of its success in mobilizing resources from donor 
countries.  In less than five years, it grew its portfolio to $5.5 
billion, invested in 131 countries.130  For the last several years, the 
Fund has mobilized resources in excess of $3 billion each year, 
despite increasing demands on scarce donor resources.131  One of 
the keys to its success as a financing mechanism lies in the 
development of engaged and empowered constituencies in donor 
countries that are invested in the institution and linked into its 
governance structure.132
Even more impressive are some of the results of the Global 
Fund on the ground, which are consistent with the growing 
 
 
128 A 2002 McKinsey & Co. study of thirty global health alliances concluded 
that upwards of 80% of public health alliances appeared to be functioning, as 
opposed to the private sector’s success rate of 50%.  The report defined success “as 
accelerating, improving, or reducing the cost of, initiatives aimed at reducing 
disease burden, by comparison with what could be accomplished by bodies acting 
individually in a ‘solitary approach.’”  KAREN CAINES ET AL., ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF 
GLOBAL HEALTH PARTNERSHIPS 10 (2004), available at http://www.theglobalfund 
.org/documents/library/studies/integrated_evaluations/GHP_Synthesis_Report.pdf; see also 
Rene Loewenson, Civil Society Influence on Global Health Policy 9 (Apr. 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the World Health Organization), available 
at http://www.tarsc.org/WHOCSI/pdf /WHOTARSC4.pdf (reporting that CSOs 
engaging governments and international organizations “have yielded benefits for 
all players within policy processes through reducing conflict, facilitating 
communication and bringing new expertise into policy processes”). 
129 For a general account of the success of the Global Fund and its 
engagement with civil society, see THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS 
AND MALARIA, AN EVOLVING PARTNERSHIP: THE GLOBAL FUND AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
THE FIGHT AGAINST AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA (2007), available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/publications/brochures/evolvingpa
rtnership/AnEvolvingPartnership_en.pdf. 
130 See Richard G.A. Feachem & Oliver J. Sabot, An Examination of the Global 
Fund at 5 Years, 368 LANCET 537, 537 (2006) (offering an overview of the Global 
Fund’s investment portfolio). 
131 Pledges and Contributions, GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND 
MALARIA, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/pledges/ (last visited Nov. 12, 
2010). 
132 See id. (listing the Global Fund’s current pledges and contributions). 
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literature on the link between participation and effectiveness in 
development.  As of the end of 2009, the Global Fund was 
providing financing for treatment for 2.5 million people suffering 
from AIDS.133  Additionally, it provided treatment to some 6 
million people living with active tuberculosis, leading to a 
reduction in tuberculosis prevalence and mortality in many target 
countries.134  It also distributed 104 million insecticide-treated bed 
nets to prevent the spread of malaria, and provided 57% of 
international disbursements for malaria control, as of 2008.135  The 
Fund estimates that its combined efforts have contributed to 
preventing some 4.9 million deaths.136
 Increasingly, many twenty-first century institutions that 
have adopted multi-stakeholder governance models are 
demonstrating impressive results that are challenging the 
traditional role of some of the leading twentieth century 
institutions.  Improved institutional transparency, deeper 
engagement with diverse societal actors, public confidence and 
support for expanded resource mobilization, and programmatic 
impact are all characteristic of many of these multi-stakeholder 
institutions. 
 
The insights that have been gained from the experience of this 
new generation of institutions have not yet been adequately 
incorporated into the theoretical debates over the design of 
international institutions.  At issue is not just the question of 
whether civil society should play a meaningful role in the 
governance of international institutions, but also the more 
challenging question of how best to incorporate non-state actors in 
ways that will maximize their contribution and minimize the risks 
that so many critics have highlighted.  It is this latter question that 
is the focus of the next section, which argues in favor of 
incorporating the insights from associative democracy theorists, 
 
133 See THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, THE 
GLOBAL FUND 2010: INNOVATION AND IMPACT RESULTS SUMMARY 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/replenishment/2010/Progress_Repo
rt_Summary_2010_en.pdf (tallying the total number of HIV/AIDS patients who 
received Global Fund financed antiretroviral therapy in 2009). 
134 See id. at 2 (estimating the number of tuberculosis patients who received 
treatment through Global Fund financed programs in 2009). 
135 See id. 
136 See id. (estimating the total number of lives saved through the Global 
Fund’s collective efforts as of December 2009). 
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and adopting constituency models as a core part of multi-
stakeholder governance. 
4. BEYOND THE MONOPOLY OF STATES 
The models of multi-stakeholder governance incorporated in 
twenty-first century international institutions challenge many 
prevailing assumptions about the proper role of states and non-
state actors in the international arena.  While the growing evidence 
regarding the effectiveness of including civil society within formal 
governance is a powerful response to critics of civil society 
participation, their concerns can nonetheless prove invaluable to 
the design of these institutions.  The insights of associative 
democracy theorists offer a new way to think about how diverse 
stakeholders might be organized to contribute to the core mission 
of many international institutions.  Constituency models of civil 
society participation hold great promise in leveraging the broader 
contribution of non-state actors while reducing the risk of narrow 
or self-interested actors who might take advantage of more 
participatory models of governance. 
One of the core challenges for any model of multi-stakeholder 
governance is to guard against non-state actors pursuing a narrow 
or self-interested agenda that does not reflect the concerns of the 
wider constituencies from which they have emerged.  Many of 
these dynamics are not new or even unique to the international 
arena, but have instead been prominent features in long-standing 
debates over the role of diverse actors in the context of national or 
local governance.  A rich literature on associative democracy and 
participatory governance offers new insights that can be applied to 
the global challenge of structuring international institutions. 
When it comes to overcoming the risks of empowering private 
actors, there is a longstanding literature that highlights the 
“mischiefs of faction” that can be produced by private interests.137  
The risk—which has been highlighted by critics of civil society 
participation—is that unaccountable actors will be empowered 
through expanded participation.138
 
137 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 72–79 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961).  Cf. Alkoby, supra note 106, at 400 (describing the dangers of 
empowering NGOs because of concerns regarding their lack of accountability). 
  However, there is also a 
138 See Scholte, supra note 42, at 231 (arguing that many civil groups lack 
adequate standards of accountability); Marguerite A. Peeters, Participatory 
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growing body of work, which highlights the positive contributions 
that civil society groups—sometimes called secondary 
associations—can make to further successful democratic 
governance.139
The core idea of associative democracy is that civil society 
groups are capable of performing useful, democracy-enhancing 
functions.
 
140  Conceptions of associative democracy highlight the 
role of civil society groups in linking citizen participation more 
closely to the exercise of public power.141  In the national context, 
scholars have highlighted the contribution that these groups can 
make by providing valuable information to policymakers, 
equalizing representation, catalyzing citizen education, and 
contributing to problem solving.  Associations can provide a 
mechanism for less powerful groups to participate in governance, 
serve as “schools of democracy,” and facilitate alternative forms of 
governance focused on problem-solving.142  However, there are 
several key qualitative features of groups that are viewed as 
necessary conditions for enabling these valuable contributions, 
including the accountability relationships between leadership and 
members, the degree to which the group fully encompasses the 
affected population, and the distribution of power and modes of 
interaction across different groups.143
Building upon this work on associative democracy, recent 
scholarship has examined innovative approaches to promoting 
  These qualitative features, 
such as breadth of the overall constituency, the relationships 
between leaders and the broader constituency, and the interaction 
between different constituencies, are also very relevant in 
evaluating civil society participation within international 
institutions. 
 
Democracy in the New Europe: A Critical Analysis 3 (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol’y 
Res.), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040402_20030611_Peeters.pdf 
(arguing that NGOs should demonstrate their representativeness and the role of 
members in decision-making). 
139 See Archon Fung, Associations and Democracy: Between Theories, Hopes and 
Realities 29 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 515, 515–16 (2003); see also Cohen & Rogers, supra 
note 6, at 395 (recognizing some of the positive contributions that civil society 
groups can make to improving governance). 
140 See Cohen & Rogers, supra note 6, at 424. 
141 See Fung supra note 139, at 533. 
142 See id. at 424–25. 
143 See id. at 428. 
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participatory democracy and governance, in which ordinary 
citizens directly engage in policymaking.144  The core insight 
motivating this literature is the observation that existing 
mechanisms of political representation are increasingly unable to 
foster adequate citizen involvement and reach consensus on major 
policy challenges.145  Archon Fung and Erik Olin-Wright have 
introduced the idea of “empowered deliberative democracy,” 
which seeks to link expanded participation with improved 
deliberation and citizen empowerment.146  They argue that 
“empowered deliberative democracy” works when people focus 
on specific tangible problems that involve ordinary people and 
engage in the deliberative design of solutions to such problems.147  
This model suggests the devolution of public decision authority to 
local units of governance.  However, the focus on specific areas of 
public problem solving in this conception is consistent with the 
approach of many twenty-first century international institutions.  
At the same time, a rough equality of power in the context of 
participation by citizens and government officials is seen in this 
literature as crucial to enabling meaningful deliberation.148  Just as 
in the international context, the benefits of expanded participation 
also extend to the likelihood of heightened commitment by diverse 
actors to effectively implement decisions.149
Central to all of these models is the underlying conception of 
deliberation and its role in effective governance.
 
150
 
144 For a discussion of participatory democracy, see generally Jeffrey D. 
Hilmer, The State of Participatory Democratic Theory, 32 NEW POL. SCI. 43 (2010). 
  Deliberation by 
itself is not necessarily either democratic or reflective of a wide 
range of views and stakeholders.  As Josh Cohen and Charles Sabel 
put it:  “[D]eliberation, understood as reasoning about how best to 
145 See Fung & Wright, supra note 6, at 5. 
146 Id. at 7. 
147 See id. at 14; Mikael Wigell, Multi-Stakeholder Cooperation in Global 
Governance 31 (Finnish Inst. of Int’l Aff., Working Paper No. 58, 2008) (“Multi-
stakeholder initiatives help to broaden discussion and identify global public needs.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
148 See, e.g., Fung & Wright, supra note 6, at 24. 
149 See id. at 26 (arguing that empowered participatory governance 
contributes to “generate and adopt proposals that enjoy broad consensus 
support”). 
150 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a 
Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1291 (2001) (discussing the importance of 
deliberation and its role in institutional design). 
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address a practical problem, is not intrinsically democratic:  it can 
be conducted within cloistered bodies that make fateful choices, 
but are inattentive to the views or the interests of large numbers of 
affected parties . . . .”151  Yet, there is an important literature which 
suggests that deliberation is enhanced by the process of assessing 
divergent views.152  While the critique of multi-stakeholder 
participation in the governance of international institutions focuses 
on how diverse views can make achieving consensus more 
difficult, recent literature on deliberation emphasizes the 
importance of the process of the discussion and elaboration of 
difference.153
Visions of deliberation going back to at least John Stuart Mill 
have focused on its role in encouraging deliberants to “weigh 
interests not his own . . . .”
 
154  Or, as Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson put it, participants in deliberations “are more likely to 
take a broader view of issues . . . in a process in which moral 
arguments are taken seriously . . . .”155
Some scholars equate civil society participation in the 
governance of international institutions with corporatist 
democracy’s structures for involving non-state actors with elected 
officials.  Under this view, civil society participation should be 
  Too frequently, the 
governance of international institutions fails to foster this type of 
deliberation, in part because of the limited range of actors and 
views that participate in the process.  Civil society participation has 
the potential to ensure not only that different views will be 
weighed, but also that expanded consideration will be given to 
views which are less constrained by short-term political constraints 
and potentially more reflective of longer-term interests. 
 
151 Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US, in 
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 157, 169 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur 
ed., 2004). 
152 See Esty, supra note 2, at 1520. 
153 See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New 
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, in EXPERIMENTALIST 
GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS A NEW ARCHITECTURE 1, 8 
(Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2010) (noting that new forms of 
deliberation that account for and incorporate a diversity of views can open up 
“new possibilities for democratization of decision making”). 
154 JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 79 
(1882). 
155 AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 42 
(1996). 
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organized around a model of intermediate associations and ensure 
that relevant associations with legitimate claims to representing the 
largest numbers of people will be selected for participation.  Yet 
strictly corporatist models pose significant challenges at the 
international level in terms of how such organizations would be 
selected, and the risk that rigidities could evolve that would 
exclude emerging stakeholders.156  One formulation for expanding 
participation that responds to this concern is the idea of striving for 
the “fullest possible participation and representation of those 
affected.”157
The central challenge to achieving these potential benefits 
resulting from multi-stakeholder governance is structuring 
participation in ways that limit the risks of enhancing the power of 
unrepresentative or parochial interests while maximizing the 
possibility that diverse stakeholders will be meaningful 
contributors to deliberation, rather than merely symbolic 
participants.
  The focus, in this view, is not just on the 
representative basis for civil society participation, but also on its 
connection to those most directly impacted by the work of a given 
institution.  
158
 
156 See Francesca Bignami, Civil Society and International Organizations: A 
Liberal Framework for Global Governance 62–64 (Duke L. Faculty Scholarship, Paper 
No. 1126, 2007), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty 
_scholarship/1126; Ottaway, supra note 11, at 266. 
  Constituency models of governance can foster both 
enhanced accountability and improved deliberation within these 
institutions.  While most major international institutions now 
provide for some form of consultation with civil society groups, 
the roles of such organizations are often extremely limited.  If 
models of consultation were the dominant approach for most of 
the twentieth century, new models of full participation in 
governance are increasingly common features of twenty-first 
century institutions. 
157 Gráinne de Búrca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 227 (2008). 
158 See Bexell et al., supra note 80, at 89–90 (noting that while transnational 
partnerships between state and non-state actors could potentially promote 
meaningful participation, learning, and dialogue, they are limited by unequal 
bargaining positions). 
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4.1. Reconciling Theory and Practice 
The next Section seeks to sketch out an approach to civil society 
participation that promotes both meaningful and accountable 
participation in the governance of international institutions.  The 
first hurdle is to identify the essential elements of the structure of 
governance without which civil society participation is unlikely to 
be robust and risks becoming merely symbolic.  The challenge of 
fostering accountable and effective multi-stakeholder institutions is 
closely tied to the way in which the participation of non-state 
actors is structured.  Among the most successful models have been 
those which require civil society representation to be grounded in 
constituencies of diverse and encompassing organizations rather 
than vested in a single individual or organization.159
Models of multi-stakeholder governance still vary a great 
deal—from participation in governing boards without voting 
rights, to full participation in governance.  Many governments, 
some scholars, and even some civil society groups traditionally 
resist the idea of allocating voting status to civil society groups 
within international institutions.  Yet it is hard to imagine a true 
partnership in any governing context in which some have voting 
rights and others do not.  This is consistent with the findings of 
work on local-level participatory governance in which a rough 
equality of power between citizens and official experts is seen as 
crucial to fostering meaningful deliberation.
  In this 
Section, these different models for structuring civil society 
participation within existing institutions are distilled in order to 
identify the structural features of a framework that fosters more 
deliberative and effective civil society participation in international 
institutions. 
160
 
159 Civil society constituencies are defined somewhat differently within 
different institutions but are often divided within multi-stakeholder institutions 
between NGOs from the global North and those from the global South.  The 
United Nations has defined its “major groups” to include constituencies such as 
trade unions, youth, women, business, and scientific experts.  Constituency 
models are also potentially valuable for structuring the participation of other 
types of non-state actors, such as the private sector, which are not the focus of this 
paper. 
  There also appear 
to be inevitable limits to the depth of partnership and the sense of 
accountability for governance in models in which NGOs serve as 
observers rather than full participants. 
160 See Fung & Wright, supra note 6, at 13–14. 
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While a number of twenty-first century institutions allocate just 
one seat to civil society, even on a relatively large board, an 
increasing number of institutions now allocate seats to civil society 
groups from the global North and South.161  In addition, some of 
these institutions designate specific seats for representatives of the 
communities most directly affected by the work of the institution, 
as well as representatives from foundations, individual experts, 
and representatives from the private sector.162
Models of civil society participation in the governance of 
international institutions that merely include an individual 
representative are much weaker than models of constituency 
representation at incorporating diverse voices, preventing co-
optation, and promoting accountability.  In contrast to a single 
individual being solely responsible for representing the views of a 
multifaceted sector, constituency models involve a delegation 
which jointly makes key policy decisions and also serves as a 
forum for learning for future and alternate board members. 
  The representation 
of both Northern and Southern actors is significant in the context 
of concerns that civil society participation in governance might 
accentuate the imbalances of representation between different 
regions of the world. 
As with associative democracy in national contexts, the degree 
to which those representing civil society actually reflect the views 
of the affected population and the existence of accountability 
mechanisms for leaders are key factors in shaping the contribution 
of civil society participation.163  Some scholars have suggested that 
the key challenge is to find ways to structure voice in order to 
“combat, rather than accentuate, existing . . . inequalities.”164
 
161 See INT’L CTR. FOR RES. ON WOMEN, supra note 109, at 1 (noting the vigorous 
participation of civil society groups from Northern and Southern regions on The 
Global Fund’s Board in contrast to limited participation by civil society 
representatives at the United Nations). 
 
162 For example, The Global Fund board includes a seat for a delegation of 
NGOs representative of people living with AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.  Board 
Delegations’ Contact Information, THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS 
AND MALARIA, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/board/delegations/ (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2010). 
163 See Cohen & Rogers, supra note 6, at 395. 
164 Michael Edwards, Introduction to GLOBAL CITIZEN ACTION 1, 7 (Michael 
Edwards & John Gaventa eds., 2001). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
GARTNER.DOC 1/13/2011  7:04 PM 
636 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:2 
In the cases of The Global Fund and more recently GAVI, the 
work of the constituency is facilitated by a communications focal 
point to ensure broad and meaningful participation by various 
stakeholders.165
Observer status for non-state actors is much less likely to 
translate into a significant role within the governance of 
international institutions because it suggests that their role is to 
watch rather than to participate in the deliberations of these 
institutions.  There are examples of institutions in which non-state 
actors are granted the rights and responsibilities of membership 
without a formal vote.
  The delegation serves as a resource and force-
multiplier for a single board member as well as a forum for 
deliberation and a potential check on a board member who might 
not adequately represent the views of a diverse constituency.  The 
constituency model is not unique to global health institutions as it 
has been adopted by other development institutions and could 
plausibly be applied to international institutions in a range of 
sectors. 
166
Another key structural feature to ensure meaningful civil 
society participation in the governance of international institutions 
is the balance of representation within these structures.  The 
allocation of just one single seat to non-state actors or even to 
global civil society actors is often a recipe for symbolic but not 
meaningful participation.  The concern is both that any single voice 
would be much more likely to be marginalized within an 
otherwise inter-governmental institution and also that a single seat 
  While this distinction matters much less 
in processes that are truly consensus based, there always remains 
the possibility of a deadlock in consensus, and if there is any role 
for formal voting then the question of whether civil society holds 
voting rights becomes much more significant. 
 
165 See GAVI ALLIANCE, MEETING REPORT: GAVI ALLIANCE CIVIL SOCIETY 
MEETING (Nov. 21, 2009), http://www.gavialliance.org/resources/Report_on 
_Gavi_CSO_Day_21_Hanoi.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2010) (highlighting GAVI’s 
intent to hire an independent communications focal point in order to support civil 
society organizations). 
166 See, e.g., GLOBAL AGRIC. & FOOD SEC. PROGRAM, GLOBAL AGRICULTURE AND 
FOOD SECURITY PROGRAM (GAFSP) GOVERNANCE DOCUMENT, 2(i) (2010), available at 
http://www.gafspfund.org/gafsp/sites/gafspfund.org/files/Documents/Gover
nanceDocument.pdf (listing the steering committee members which are made up 
of both voting and non-voting members). 
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would not allow for the inclusion of both those from the Northern 
and Southern Hemispheres.  Civil society groups in the South too 
often lack any role in the governance of international institutions 
while groups in the North often have greater resources to influence 
other actors within these institutions.  As a result, to include one 
and not both of these actors is much more likely to result in 
participation that is either unbalanced or insufficiently heard. 
No less important than the challenge of fostering full 
participation by civil society actors is that of promoting the 
accountability and effectiveness of these actors.  Any model in 
which individuals disconnected from a broader constituency 
structure are the sole participants risks inadequate accountability.  
Constituency models which link representation to a broader 
delegation and encompass a diverse group of stakeholders are 
much more likely to reflect the views of the broader constituency.  
A major challenge is defining which groups should be included 
and excluded from participation in a given constituency.  In 
defining the breadth of a given constituency, the principle of self-
organization is central for many institutions.167
Just as important as ensuring accountability for non-state actors 
in the governance of international institutions, is fostering the 
capacity for these stakeholders to effectively participate.  One of 
the models that has proven most effective to promote 
communication within diverse and geographically dispersed 
delegations and for supporting the capacity of individual 
participants is the creation of a designated communications focal 
point for the delegation.
  A risk this poses is 
that early participants will become entrenched in their roles and 
prevent the involvement of new groups.  Limited terms and 
mechanisms for promoting new leadership are both critical to 
limiting the likelihood of ossification.  Delegations can provide a 
forum for the development of new leadership within the 
constituency and, when necessary, for accountability mechanisms 
for board representatives who might be pursuing narrow interests. 
168
 
167 See THE GLOBAL FUND FOR AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, GUIDELINES 
ON CONSTITUENCY PROCESS, available at http://www.theglobalfund.org 
/documents/publications/other/ConstituencyProcesses/ConstituencyProcesses
Guidelines_en.pdf (discussing constituency formation and composition). 
  The key role is to facilitate deliberation, 
168 See id. (listing “[e]xcellent communication skills” as a key focal point); see 
also GAVI Civil Society Communications Focal Point, GAVI ALLIANCE, 
http://www.gavialliance.org/employment/card.php?empID=92 (last visited Nov. 22, 
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preparation, and engagement with other board members rather 
than to replace or bypass the delegation and its representatives on 
the board.169
A new framework for evaluating the participation by civil 
society in the governance of international institutions should 
involve a two-part test.  First, the relevant international institution 
should be structured in such a way as to foster effective 
participation and maximize the contribution of civil society actors 
to the mission of the institution.  The consultative models of most 
twentieth century institutions are unlikely to meet this test and 
observer models will have difficulty doing so as well because 
neither approach is as likely to catalyze the full contribution of civil 
society actors.  Second, civil society participation should be 
designed to maximize the accountability of civil society actors to a 
broad constituency of affected stakeholders.  Models in which 
disconnected individuals from NGOs serve on boards would not 
meet this test, and models that involve the selection of a single 
large or well-known NGO are also unlikely to meet this test. 
 
For each of these two critical dimensions, the effective 
participation and accountability of civil society, three minimum 
conditions can serve as benchmarks in evaluating civil society 
participation.  The minimum conditions for effective participation 
by civil society in the governance of international institutions are:  
1) full membership as part of the governing body, which usually 
but not always will involve some form of voting rights; 2) 
participation by more than a single representative; and 3) the 
inclusion of both Southern and Northern stakeholders.  The 
minimum conditions for accountability for civil society 
participation within international institutions are:  1) the existence 
of a constituency-based approach to participation; 2) a civil society 
delegation that encompasses a diverse range of stakeholders, 
including those most affected; and 3) a communications focal point 
to facilitate deliberation and communication within the delegation. 
This approach to evaluating civil society participation in the 
governance of international institutions treats effective and 
 
2010) (posting an employment opportunity specifically for a communications 
focal point to develop communications fools for the GAVI Alliance). 
169 See GAVI Civil Society Communications Focal Point, supra note 168 
(discussing the purpose and main responsibilities of the communications focal 
point). 
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accountable participation as equally important ultimate objectives.  
Voting rights without a constituency based model would empower 
some non-state actors, but not necessarily leverage the broader 
contribution from the sector that contributes to the overall quality 
of decision-making and institutional effectiveness.  Robust civil 
society participation depends on creating enough room at the 
governance table for non-state actors to make a major contribution 
and ensuring enough connection to a broader constituency so that 
this contribution is accountable and catalytic of wider efforts 
among diverse stakeholders. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In the twenty-first century, a wide range of complex global 
challenges will require unprecedented levels of global cooperation 
between states and non-state actors.  Yet, few leading international 
institutions today are designed to effectively leverage the 
resources, ingenuity, and connectivity of diverse societal actors.  
While some scholars maintain the “monopoly of states” view that 
civil society should not meaningfully participate in the governance 
of international institutions, a new generation of multi-stakeholder 
institutions points toward a new approach to understanding the 
relationship between non-state actors and international 
institutions. 
The core challenge to improving the performance of 
international institutions in meeting contemporary global 
challenges, as Ernest Haas explained, is that most international 
institutions are much better at adapting than engaging in 
meaningful learning processes:  “Adaptive behavior is common, 
whereas true learning is rare.  The very nature of institutions is 
such that the dice are loaded in favor of the less demanding 
behavior associated with adaptation.”170
 
170 ERNST B. HAAS, WHEN KNOWLEDGE IS POWER: THREE MODELS OF CHANGE IN 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 37 (1990). 
  Haas’ point and the 
experience of the leading international institutions established in 
the twentieth century both strongly suggest that if the design of 
these institutions is not inclusive from the beginning, the 
opportunities for transformation of governance within existing 
institutions may be quite limited. 
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Multi-stakeholder approaches to governance could be adopted 
within a wide range of international institutions.  Yet it also may be 
the case that these models will be most successful in institutions 
which are more focused on specific tangible problems, which make 
it easier to involve non-state actors in deliberation over the 
solutions to those problems.  For this reason, global health and 
development institutions have proven to be particularly fertile 
ground for innovations with respect to civil society participation in 
governance.  Certainly, the role of these institutions in providing 
global public goods highlights the importance of effective 
implementation that engages diverse stakeholders.  Nonetheless, 
even for many institutions with a very different focus and mission, 
the benefits of broadened participation could remain valuable in 
improving deliberation and enlisting the contributions of diverse 
societal actors.  Future research on a wider range of sectors and 
diverse institutional models of civil society participation will be 
extremely valuable in demonstrating the possibility and limits of 
multi-stakeholder governance. 
In responding to many global challenges, international 
institutions may ultimately be more successful by expanding 
multi-stakeholder involvement in their governance structures.  
Evidence from a number of twenty-first century institutions 
suggests that greater civil society participation can lead to 
enhanced transparency, more effective deliberation, greater public 
credibility, and more effective implementation of programs.  Yet it 
remains possible that expanded participation in the governance of 
international institutions in some contexts may diminish 
institutional effectiveness.171
 
171 See generally JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL, WORLD RULE: ACCOUNTABILITY, 
LEGITIMACY, AND THE DESIGN OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2010) (arguing that there 
exists a tradeoff between expanding participation in governance and building and 
maintaining what he terms the authority of international institutions, in 
regulatory areas including the environment).  But see Kal Raustiala, Nonstate 
Actors in the Global Climate Regime, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE 95, 115–16 (MIT Press, 2001) (arguing that the participation of 
NGOs in formal international cooperation enhances the ability of states to 
regulate new areas in the environmental context).  
  Constituency models of participation 
may offer a pathway to better harness the potential contribution of 
civil society and reduce such tradeoffs.  Further research is needed 
to better explore the interplay between expanded participation and 
institutional effectiveness within diverse institutions and the 
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mechanisms through which different models of participation 
might alter these dynamics.  
It is unlikely that states alone will be able to respond to the 
greatest challenges of the twenty-first century.  Even with 
enhanced cooperation between states, it is increasingly clear that 
non-state actors are essential to responding to key challenges 
across a wide range of issues.  Although it is possible to imagine 
expanded cooperation between state and non-state actors without 
a fundamental shift toward multi-stakeholder governance, it may 
prove difficult for many international institutions to be successful 
and accountable in the long-run without governance structures 
that catalyze the contributions of civil society actors. 
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